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Nature of the Problem of Police Brutality
Robert J. Bowers*
T O PROPERLY APPRAISE the oft-bruited problem of police
brutality, one should first consider how investigatory
duties came to devolve upon the police in the United States.
The origin of these police powers is traceable to the period
in English history before there existed any police force as such.'
At this time, law enforcement responsibilities were vested in the
justices of the peace, who were empowered to arrest and im-
prison on the basis of indictment or suspicion. In part, at least,
this system was that which was adopted in colonial America.2
However, in America early development of the offices of the
county prosecutor and the sheriff in frontier communities pre-
vented justices of the peace and city magistrates from assuming
much prominence in the investigatory aspect of law enforce-
ment; instead they assumed the more judicial role familiar
today.3
In this early system, the practice was for private citizens to
complain of criminal acts to the magistrate, and then for the
magistrate to determine whether or not to make an arrest. Ob-
viously the magistrate could not personally attend to all of these
arrests; therefore, he resorted to the issuance of warrants and
the delegation of the authority to arrest to police. Upon arrest,
the suspect would be brought before the magistrate, who would
personally interrogate him in order to determine whether or not
the suspect should be held for trial.
As the magistrate grew out of his role as investigator and
prosecutor and became more confined to his judicial role, it was
apparent that someone else had to assume the first functions.
Someone had to gather evidence and present it in court at a
preliminary hearing. The police had to assume the investi-
gatory role.
* B.S. in B.A., Kent State Univ.; Operations Analyst, National City Bank,
Cleveland; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Bald-
win-Wallace College.
1 Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge,
50 Calif. L. Rev. 11 (1962).
2 Id. at 17, citing Haskins, Law and Authority in Massachusetts, 174-75, 200
(1960).
3 Barrett, supra n. 1.
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Two questions then arose: Were they to have the same
powers as the magistrates had had to arrest persons and to
conduct in-custody investigations? Were they to be allowed to
interrogate suspects in order to determine whether or not they
were to be brought before a magistrate and charged with an
offense? These questions, unfortunately, were not faced squarely.
While the police clearly had the actual responsibility of securing
evidence for presentation to the magistrate, in order to justify
holding the defendant for trial, the theory still persisted that
"the primary responsibility for determining whether a person
shall be taken into custody and whether he shall be held to
answer for a public offense is vested in the magistrate." 4 Even
a perfunctory consideration of actual practice will reveal that
it is far from the theory. Thus, many of our criminal statutes
define crimes in which participation is consensual, and in which,
therefore, there is contemplated no complainant (e.g., prostitu-
tion, sale and use of narcotics, etc.). These crimes cannot fol-
low the old system of depending upon the victimized person to
carry forward the criminal prosecution; the responsibility for
investigation, and apprehension, have manifestly been shifted
to the police.
Responsibility without concomitant, well-defined authority
is an onerous thing in any job. Therefore, with this understand-
ing of the position in which the police often find themselves, we
may more objectively consider the problem of police brutality.
Brutality at Time of Arrest
Charges of brutality at the time of arrest are many in num-
ber. Few arrests are made with the consent of the criminal, and
there are many instances in which the criminal resists arrest.
To enable police to carry out their function in making arrests,
the authority to make an arrest, with or without warrant, of
necessity carries with it the privilege to use that reasonable
force necessary to effectuate the arrest. 5 Whether or not the
force used was reasonable is a question of fact for the jury, to
be determined in the light of the peculiar facts of any given
case.6
4 Id. at 19.
5 Prosser on Torts, 111 (2d ed. 1955).
6 Ibid.; and see Clark v. DeWalt, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 193, 114 N. E. 2d 126
(1953); Nicholson v. Malone, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 206, 168 N. E. 2d 155 (1960)
involving an off-duty policeman.
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Where the prisoner resists the officer's command, the of-
ficer may use such force as is reasonably necessary to accom-
plish the imprisonment.7 Force, said Judge Skeel in Schweder
v. Baratko et al.,s when used lawfully in making an arrest is in
the exercise of a governmental function, and only in cases where
excessive force is used can such force be claimed to be an as-
sault and battery by the persons arrested. 9 The law can not,
unfortunately, nicely measure the degree of force which may
be used. For instance, a police officer's use of a blackjack in
protecting himself when attacked may be considered not to
be excessive force even though the prisoner dies from a blow
therefrom.' Of course, this implies that the police officer may
assert as a defense, in either a civil or criminal action for assault
and battery alleged to have been committed while making an
arrest or conducting someone to prison, that it is his duty to
keep his prisoner under control and that as long as he uses no
more force than necessary under the circumstances, he is not
liable."
The "reasonable force" so frequently spoken of is often de-
fined in penal statutes. However, the statutes often define this
phrase not in terms of whether or not the force was truly rea-
sonable, but whether or not it was "necessary for the arrest"
of the alleged criminal. 12
Municipal Liability
Regardless of how the reasonableness of the force is defined,
it should be noted that, absent any statutory provision imposing
liability, or any provision in the municipal charter making mem-
7 State v. Yingling, 36 Ohio L. Abs. 436, 44 N. E. 2d 361 (1942); see also,
5 Ohio Jur. 2d, Arrest, Secs. 50, 58.
8 103 Ohio App. 399, 143 N. E. 2d 486 (1957). It is interesting to note here
that the case held that in an action for assault and battery alleged to have
been unlawfully committed upon the person of the plaintiff by defendants,
who alleged that at the time they were attempting to arrest plaintiff for
careless driving, evidence of plaintiff's conviction for careless driving was
not admissible as proof of res gestae or to challenge plaintiff's credibility,
but it was admissible to show that there was probable cause for causing
arrest of plaintiff.
9 Ibid.
10 State v. Yingling, supra n. 7.
11 5 Ohio Jur. 2d, Arrest, Secs. 50, 58; for an interesting discussion of the
defense in general see, Justification for the Use of Force in the Criminal
Law, 13 Stanford L. Rev. 566 (1961).
12 See: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., See. 13-1401(B) (1956); 4 Idaho Code Ann.,
Sec. 19-610 (1948); A. L. I. Code of Criminal Procedure, 229 (1930).
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bers of the police force agents of the municipality, a city or-
dinarily is not liable for the employment-acts of its police of-
ficers. 13 A city is not liable, in general, for the acts of its of-
ficers in attempting to enforce its regulations, even if the regula-
tions themselves are void. 14 Further, police cannot be regarded
as servants or agents of the municipality so as to render it
liable for their unlawful or negligent acts, even if such acts are
done in the discharge of their duties.15 The appointment of
police is vested in the municipalities by legislatures, as an ap-
propriate way of exercising a governmental function; but this
usually does not make the municipalities liable for assaults or
other tortious acts of the officers done while acting in the per-
formance of their duties. 16
Statutes or provisions in municipal charters may, as stated
above, make police officers agents of the municipality, and thus
render the municipality liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior; in which case bonding is required and the legislative
enactment may provide for the conditions of liability. 17 In
the cases where provision has been made for liability, the ques-
tion usually turns on whether the acts of the police officer were
virtute officii or colore officii.
Acts virtute offcii are acts done under the authority vested
in the officer, although such acts are done in an improper man-
ner or with abuse of discretion.1 8 Acts done colore officii are
those acts which, although done under color of the office, are
not acts of such nature that the office gives any authority for
their performance. 19 For an interesting case on this point see
13 63 C. J. S., Municipal Corporations, Sec. 775, et seq.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.; see also, Bishton, Municipal Corporations-Immunity-Municipality
Liable for Torts of Police Officers under Respondeat Superior, 33 Notre
Dame Law. 304 (1958); and see, Prosser on Torts, 775-6 (2d ed. 1955)
wherein it is stated that "There is ordinarily no liability for the torts of
police officers, even where they commit unjustifiable assault and bat-
tery ....
17 See for example: Const. Md., Art. 4, See. 45, and Md. Code Ann., Art. 87,
Secs. 2, 4 (1957) (Surety on sheriff's official bond liable only for official acts
of sheriff in execution of his office arising under common law or statute).
1 Aldridge v. Wooten, 68 Ga. App. 887, 24 S. E. 2d 700 (1943); State to Use
of Brooks v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 147 Md. 194, 127 A. 758
(1925).
19 State v. Roy, 41 N. M. 308, 68 P. 2d 162 (1937); State v. Fidelity & De-
posit Co., supra n. 18.
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State to Use of Brooks v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland,20
where the facts were as follows: A prisoner, while in the sheriff's
custody and under sentence of death, escaped through the neg-
ligence of the sheriff. While the escapee was at large, the
sheriff, without warrant, took one Isabella Brooks into custody
for a period of thirty days on a charge of aiding the escapee.
While Isabella was in jail, the sheriff, in order to force her to
disclose information, caused her to be bound about the wrists
and suspended from the ceiling without support for her feet.
He proceeded to question, torture and mistreat her while she
was suspended.
Brutality Subsequent to Arrest
Most cases of alleged brutality are claimed to occur in a
"third-degree" interrogation which usually is alleged to have
occurred during the period between arrest and preliminary ex-
amination. It is generally acceptable to allow police at the
initial stages of investigation to question anyone who may be
helpful in providing information which will aid them in their
crime detection. However, it is naive to assume that when the
stage has been reached where suspicion has centered upon some
person as the likely perpetrator of the crime, that interrogation
will cease. But it is assumed that there will be no coercive at-
tempt to extract or extort a confession from the prisoner, for
such confession would surely not be admissible. 21 However, the
courts of all States have held it to be permissible to introduce
confessions secured by questioning of suspects who were in the
custody of crime detection officials. 22
Actually, in most instances, the courts have not even dis-
cussed the basic legality of in-custody interrogation. Instead,
they have concentrated on determining the point at which to
draw the line where the police have gone too far, and thus ren-
dered any confession inadmissible due to coercion.23
Coercion can be as brutal when it involves mental torture as
when it involves physical force.2 4 The whole atmosphere of the
20 Supra n. 18.
21 McCormick on Evidence, Ch. 12, Sec. 111, 231-2 (1954).
22 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1037 (1961), citing (at
note 38) cases from all states on this point.
23 See in general, McCormick on Evidence, Ch. 12 (1954), and Maguire,
Evidence of Guilt, Ch. 3 (1959).
24 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, at 52, 93 L. Ed. 1801 (1948).
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in-custody interrogation may be suggestive of mental coercion.
The prisoner knows that what actually happens to him behind
the closed doors at the interrogation is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to prove. If, through misguided zeal or short temper of
one of his inquisitors, he is subjected to physical abuse, he
knows that he faces the almost insuperable difficulty of proving
this without the aid of any friendly witness. His testimony al-
most surely will stand alone in the face of solemn official de-
nials.25
Thus there inevitably is opportunity and temptation for the
police to try to force the prisoner to be the unwilling collabora-
tor in establishing his own guilt.26
There appears to be general acceptance of the premise that
the reasonable examination of a suspect ". . . should be allowed
in the interest of public welfare." 27 But it is also generally
noted that ". . . such examinations should be kept within
bounds, and cruel and brutal methods should never be toler-
ated." 28 Police officers, it is true, are incessantly confronted by
the difficult task of handling prisoners many of whom are hard-
ened and resourceful. Although courts will go far in their sup-
port if they have acted in good faith in an effort to protect so-
ciety, and although the securing of voluntary confessions from
guilty prisoners is desirable, 29 still the confession not volun-
tarily given cannot be accepted in evidence, 30 and the police
officer who goes too far cannot be deemed justified in an action
against him for assault and battery.31 It is not within the prov-
25 Culombe v. Connecticut, supra n. 22, at 573-4.
26 Id. at 575; see also, Steven v. State, 26 Ohio App. 53, 159 N. E. 834 (1927)
where in a prosecution for robbery the evidence of mistreatment of the de-
fendant in an effort to extort a confession was excluded when the officers
accused of the mistreatment did not testify; the evidence being competent
only as reflecting on the testimony of parties guilty of mistreatment.
27 6 C.J.S., Assault and Battery, Sec. 97, at 954.
28 Ibid.; also, Bonahoon v. State, 203 Ind. 51, 178 N. E. 570 (1931).
29 Bonahoon v. State, supra n. 28; Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 151, 139 N. E.
2d 185 (1956).
30 People v. Joe, 31 Ill. (2d) 220, 201 N. E. 2d 416 (1964); State v. Stewart,
120 Ohio App. 195, 201 N. E. 2d 793 (1963) (U. S. cert. den.); Wallace v.
State, 235 Ind. 538, 135 N. E. 2d 512 (1956) where one was held without
sleep for 22 hours, with one meal, and subjected to "unexplained physical
harm."
31 6 C. J. S., Assault and Battery, Sec. 36 at 842; also Sec. 97 at 954 wherein
it is stated that "it is no defense that the assault was committed on a
prisoner . .. if the punishment inflicted was excessive."
Sept., 1965
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol14/iss3/17
POLICE BRUTALITY
ince of the police to assume the guilt of a person and to subject
him to the third-degree.3 2 They could not have assumed
. . . his guilt, and refused to credit his denials and his
protestations . . . until they have extorted from him the ...
confession. Such proceedings are without excuse . . . and
to tolerate them or to ignore them without rebuke is to
bring reproach upon the law and convert the administra-
tion of justice into an engine for the perpetration of rank
injustice.33
It is the duty of an officer to protect his prisoner from the as-
saults of others; how much greater then is his duty not to as-
sault the prisoner himself! 34
There is little doubt that most policemen do not generally
start questioning with any intention of using force. But the
burden which society has placed upon them, coupled with* the
secrecy in which the police station interrogation is generally
carried out, are so conducive to excesses that such cases are not
unusual.35 Since Brown v. Mississippi,3G the courts have held
that it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as
of other law, to allow the body or the mind of an accused to be
tortured. Yet relatively little has been done to insure the pre-
vention of these methods.
It appears that it is not even necessary for an accused to
be cautioned that he has a right to say nothing,3 7 and certainly
it appears that the police discourage the appearance of an at-
torney to assist the accused and inform him of his rights.38
Since ". . any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in
no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any
circumstances," 3 9 the police do all in their power to avoid al-
32 State v. Thomas, 193 Iowa 1004, 188 N. W. 689 (1922).
33 Ibid.
34 Union Indemnity Co. v. Cunningham, 22 Ala. App. 226, 114 So. 285 (1927).
35 See: The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 Geo.
L. J. 1, at 27 (1958).
.36 297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461 (1936). In this case, one of the accused was
even hanged to a tree and let down and pulled up again. On the same day
that the confessions were extorted, they were arraigned and trial was set
for the following morning without an opportunity for them to consult with
counsel. (This case began the doctrine of inadmissibility of forced confes-
sions under the Due Process clause.)
37 People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. (2d) 375, 202 N. E. 2d 33 (1964) (U. S. Sup.
Ct. appeal pending).
38 Culombe v. Connecticut, supra n. 22.
39 Watts v. Indiana, supra n. 24.
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lowing the suspect contact with his attorney during this period.
Even under the "allowed-one-call rule" the police generally con-
strue the rule to mean allowed one call after being booked; this
sometimes is not until long after interrogation.
Corrective Action
Because of our multitude of autonomous police departments,
and because of the manner of development of the authority and
responsibility of these police departments, there has been little
supervision or control of this problem. In an attempt to fill this
vacuum, the courts have attempted to exercise judicial con-
trol; 40 however, this cannot be the entire answer. The writer
feels that the best approach to solving this dilemma is through
intelligent legislation of the type suggested by Professor Barrett
as a result of his studies on the subject under a grant from
the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute.4 1
The most significant suggestions are that the laws govern-
ing detention for investigative purposes should be well defined,
and that authorization therefor should be limited to certain cir-
cumstances. The types of limitation suggested are the following:
A. Reasonable cause should exist to justify such detention.
B. Detention should be authorized only when reasonably
necessary to the completion of an investigation. Detention
might be considered necessary under circumstances like
the following:
1. Where evidence of a crime might disappear if the de-
fendant were not detained so that a search could be
conducted.
2. Where the suspect might be likely to flee.
3. Where identification procedures are necessary to de-
termine if the suspect committed the offense.
4. Where it is necessary to check records, make labora-
tory tests, or interview complaining witnesses, etc.
C. The duration of detention should be determined by the
standard of reasonable necessity for completion of the in-
vestigation, not to exceed say 48 hours (of course with a
40 The Supreme Court alone wrote ten opinions dealing with these prob-
lems in 1961: Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961); Wilson v. Schnettler,
365 U. S. 381 (1961); Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505 (1961);
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534 (1961); Chapman v. United States, 365
U. S. 610 (1961); Coppola v. United States, 365 U. S. 762 (1961); Reck v.
Pate, 367 U. S. 433 (1961); Culombe v. Connecticut, supra n. 22; Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717 (1961).
41 Barrett, supra n. 1.
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provision for limited extension by a magistrate upon
proper application to him).42
These, along with suggestions concerning a method of shifting
the detention from the police to an independent agency, and sug-
gestions as to informing the suspect of his rights at the outset,
are greatly needed reforms, for the words spoken by Patrick
Henry are as true today as they were when he said:
What has distinguished our ancestors?-That they would
not admit of tortures ... to extort a confession of the
crime ... they will tell you that there is necessity of
strengthening the arm of government, that they must . . .
extort confessions by torture . . . WE ARE THEN LOST
AND UNDONE. 43
42 Ibid.
43 3 Elliot's Debates (2d ed., 1891).
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